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A Deposit Insurance System for Armenia
by Artak Manukyan
We provide an overview of the design for a system of official deposit guarantees for the Republic of
Armenia.  This proposed design takes into consideration the overall structure of the Armenian economy,
its official institutions and the financial system.  Furthermore, we outline specific design features for the
Armenian deposit insurance system that are consistent with the social welfare objectives that underpin
arguments for its adoption, while minimizing the distortions of these government guarantees on
incentives.  Key among the design features are limited coverage of deposits, separation of deposit
insurance from central banking, and extended liability of banks for losses incurred by the deposit
insurance fund.A Deposit Insurance System for Armenia 
 
 
One of the widely cited reasons for the collapse of the USSR is the absence of market 
incentives.  It is not surprising, therefore, that after the breakup of the former Soviet 
Union the post soviet countries were faced with a difficult transition from an economic 
system based on central planning to a market-oriented one.  This process of transition can 
be long and arduous because the at the most fundamental level market economies require 
the presence of system of enforceable private property rights, which are an anathema in 
centrally planned socialist societies.  Therefore, the success of market-oriented reforms is 
conditioned upon fundamental legislative reforms, including well-defined constitutional 
rules establishing property rights.  Moreover, these reforms must include a legal 
infrastructure within which private contracts can be written and enforced.  
The Republic of Armenia (Armenia) was founded on September 21, 1991; following 
the breakup of the USSR.  Since that time, Armenia has struggled with making the 
transition to a more market-oriented economy.  It has had some success putting in place 
needed legislative reforms (especially in legal environment), but unfortunately, there is 
considerable work left to do.  This is especially true in the establishment of the regulatory 
infrastructure to support and promote the development of Armenia’s financial sector. 
An important early step of reform in transition economies is the development of 
market-oriented financial institutions.  Financial market development is the key to 
providing cheap and reliable funding for small business and agriculture, critical to a 
developing nation’s growth.  In addition, financial institutions provide an alternative to 
currency and other non-interest-bearing assets for individuals to hold their savings. A 
  2stable financial sector should provide benefits to the economy by increasing the level of 
savings and lower the cost of investing in productive activities. 
Economic reforms in Armenia were mainly aimed at the following problems; the 
solution of some of them is still underway:  
•  Liberalization of prices and salaries;  
•  Establishment and development of the institution of private property, privatization 
of state enterprises and state property;  
•  Liberalization of foreign trade; 
•  Establishment of financial institutions and financial management bodies (Central 
Bank, Securities Commission); 
•  Establishment of the new system of state finance management; 
•  Attraction and promotion of direct foreign investment, etc.  
 
A positive factor in future growth of the Armenian economy is its high ranking in 
economic freedom.  The Republic of Armenia is ranked in the ‘mostly free’ category by 
Freedom House index in 2003
1.  In addition, Armenia’s success in terms of economic 
reforms has been accompanied by membership in the Council of Europe in 2001 and the 
World Trade Organization in 2002.   
To date, growth has been encumbered by the inability of Armenia to attract foreign 
capital (see Figure 2).  Many factors have made Armenia an unattractive place for foreign 
firms to invest, including: the small size of the Armenian market, the poor investment 
climate, and isolation from the neighboring markets.  The poor investment climate stems 
from internal problems that both impede the development of financial markets in 
Armenia and in turn hinder the attraction and promotion of foreign investment, mainly: 
                                                           
1 In 2003 Armenia is 44 by ranking according to index of economic freedom 2003, and it’s overall score is 
2.65 (2.70 in 2002) and by scores of Freedom House-partly free in 2002 (4.4). See http://cf.heritage.org and 
www.freedomhouse.org. 
  3corruption and bureaucracy; inefficient tax and customs administration; failure to 
implement agreements to provide an efficient legal framework, resolution of economic 
disputes and bankruptcy processes (especially in the banking sector).  
As in most emerging economies the establishment of a politically independent central 
bank is an important part of the financial system infrastructure.  In Armenia, the central 
bank is responsible for monetary policy, providing liquidity support for the financial 
system, and regulating financial institutions.
2 Typical for a transition economy, the 
banking system makes up nearly the entire financial system and hence, a well-functioning 
banking sector is critical to economic development. 
We take as given that the Republic of Armenia is committed to the establishment of 
an independent deposit insurance agency to provide a minimum level of deposit 
guarantees – a level consistent with protecting the savings of small depositors – to 
enhance the stability of the primary channel for credit in Armenia.  Moreover, the 
Republic of Armenia may need to establish some form of deposit insurance system as 
part of the conditions for aid from international bodies such as the IMF and the World 
Bank.  Recent literature (Kane [2000], Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane [2002], and Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache [2000]) on the adoption of deposit insurance systems outside the 
United States points to the importance of tailoring the deposit insurance scheme to fit the 
cultural and legal traditions, as well as the institutional structure, of the Republic of 
Armenia. Therefore, a careful analysis of Armenia’s legal and economic structure must 
be done prior to the design of the deposit insurance system. 
                                                           
2 The Armenian Law on “The Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia” was adopted in March 27 1993. 
  4The Armenian Economy 
The Armenian economy has faced a difficult transition to a market-oriented economy.  
During the Soviet regime, the former republics were strongly connected to each other. 
The Soviet economy operated like of a central-planning trade zone where production of 
goods was allocated across republics.  Flows of inter-republic trade reflected the initial 
allocation decision.  The collapse of the centrally planned allocation system disrupted 
trade between the former republics and the lost trade, markets, and/or methods of 
resolving inter-republic affairs caused a dramatic decline in economic activity in these 
countries.  Over 1990-2001, annual growth in GDP for Armenia was about -0.70%
3.  
However, as Armenia has instituted market-oriented reforms the Armenian economy has 
sped up.  Over the past three years Armenia’s real GDP increased 6% in 2000, 9.6% in 
2001 and 12.9% in 2002.  Per capita GDP, as Figure 1 shows, has also been growing 
during the three years.  
Declines in real activity following the collapse of the USSR were broad-based.  Many 
sectors of the Armenian operated below 1990 levels even a decade later (see table 1).  
Still, agriculture recovered in the late 1990s and its output materially exceeds 1990 
levels. 
Agriculture plays a crucial role in Armenian economy as over a quarter of the 
Republic of Armenia’s GDP (25.5 percent in 2002) is produced by this sector. The share 
of agricultural product in the GDP during 1994-2002 can be see in Figure 9 and the 
structure of gross agricultural output of RA is presented in Table 2. An important 
advantage for Armenia in its development is self-sufficiency in producing the main 
                                                           
3 See the World Development Report 2003, p. 238. 
  5agricultural products consumed by its population (see table 2) lessening the need to 
generate foreign-exchange reserves to import foodstuffs. 
The industrial sector – mining, manufacturing, and utilities – accounts is the second 
largest sector of the Armenian economy accounting for 22.7 percent of GDP in 2002 (see 
figure 10). The level of output for each component of industrial production, as well as the 
relative shares of mining, manufacturing and utilities (production and distribution of 
electricity and water) can be seen in tables 3 through 5.  Not surprisingly, as table 1 
shows, the level of industrial output was severely affected by the trade disruptions 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union, dropping to less than 40 percent of 1990 
levels by 1992.  Despite nearly continuous growth in industrial output since 1993, growth 
has been slow and 2002 levels of real output are slightly more than half of 1990 levels. 
Relative to its main trading partners (Belgium, Iran, Russia and the United States) 
Armenia has low labor costs.  Moreover, the Republic of Armenia has very few barriers 
to trade and foreign investment.
4  Low labor costs and a stable legal framework for 
exporting goods has failed to promote a rapid expansion of industrial production, in part, 
because of Armenia’s antiquated capital stock.  As we will discuss later, the 
modernization of Armenia’s capital stock to date has been hindered by an 
underdeveloped financial system and generally poor domestic investment environment. 
As seen in Figure 12, despite a self-sufficient position in agricultural production and 
energy production, Armenian continues to experience large trade deficits.  While the size 
of the trade deficit has been shrinking, the current account deficit in 2002 was 483.8 
million USD, or about 78 percent of Armenian GDP (without humanitarian aid the 
                                                           
4 According to Heritage foundation evaluations the score of Armenian trade policy is 1, which means very 
low level of protectionism and absence of non-tariff barriers (see 2002 Index of economic freedom p. 95). 
  6current account deficit is about $472.1 million USD).  Moreover, excluding agriculture 
and energy, Armenia is a net exporter of just one commodity - artworks (about 0.73 
million USD)
5.  One growing area of trade that has positive implications for the 
Armenian economy is precious stones.  From tables 6-11 one can see that precious stones 
has makes up the largest share of imports and exports.  The reason for this is the low cost 
of labor in Armenia.  Belgium exports diamonds to Armenia where the labor-intensive 
process of refining diamonds is done.  The refined gemstones are then exported back to 
Belgium.  In 2002, diamonds accounted for 42 percent of the 507.2 million USD of 
exports. 
Legal Institutions and Structure (Executive, Legislative, Judiciary Bodies) 
Since 1991, an independent Republic of Armenia has continued on its course of 
fundamental reforms towards a democratic society. This process of reforms resulting, in 
many cases, in the of creation of the new institutional systems needed for establishment 
of civil liberties, the transition to a market oriented economic system, the creation of a 
legal framework and the establishment of the rule of law, and the formation of 
democratic state governance remains ongoing.  In accordance with the principle of 
separation of powers, the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of the government 
were separated. The institution of the RA President was introduced
6, the institution of the 
Prime Minister was established, the creation of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Armenian was envisaged, and the election system was upgraded. In 1995, the RA 
Supreme Council was replaced with the RA National Assembly (Parliament).  
                                                           
5 In 2002 total volume of export of RA was 507.2 million USD; import was 991.0 mln USD. 
6 In June 1991, in accordance with the “Law on the Republic of Armenia President” was adopted by the 
Supreme Council. 
  7The RA President is the head of state. He is a political figure, who coordinates and 
unites the activities of all branches of state power
7. The RA President appoints the Prime 
Minister and, by the Prime Minister’s motion, appoints the members of the RA 
government.  The executive power in the RA is also implemented by the RA government, 
which is a collegiate body and consists of the prime minister and ministers. The RA 
prime minister occupies a special place in the government. Based on the Constitution, 
laws, Parliamentary and Presidential decrees, the prime minister is the head of the 
executive branch directing managing the current activities of the government and 
coordinating the work of the ministers. 
Legislative power in the Republic of Armenia is implemented by the Parliament, 
which works in three domains: legislative, monitoring and organization of the work at the 
Parliament. The Armenian Parliament consists of one chamber and has 131 members. 
Adoption of laws is the key function of the Parliament
8. 
The third branch of government, the judicial system, consists of two bodies:  the 
judiciary and law enforcement.  The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia 
performs the central role in the Armenian judicial system.  The Constitutional Court has 
nine members, from which five are appointing by the National Assembly, and four by the 
President. The decisions of this body are the final, with no provision for appeal. 
The Armenian Financial System 
The particular importance of the banking system in the financial sector lies in its 
economy widespread connections, through which firms rely heavily in bank credit to 
                                                           
7 The Republic of Armenia President is not a subject of legislative initiative, however, without the signature 
of the President the law adopted by the Parliament cannot come into effect. At the same time, the 
Presidential veto has relative, postponing effect. 
8 The priority is given to the adoption of the main financial law of the state. 
  8finance their operations and investment.
9  The current unattractiveness of Armenia to 
foreign investors means that economic development, at least initially, must be financed 
from the domestic savings pool.   
It is well-established that the level of financial development is strongly associated 
with growth in real per capita GDP growth, capital accumulation and economic 
efficiency.
10  A sound financial sector also helps to create employment in other sectors of 
the economy.  Growth and stability in the financial sector raises the standard of living in 
an emerging market economy.
11  Financial stability is important because it increases 
public confidence in the financial.  This in turn, allows the pool of savings to be 
productively employed in the financing of small business and small agricultural 
enterprises, the primary source of growth and new jobs in Armenia. 
The banking sector plays crucial role in the development of Armenian economy. The 
main reason is that Armenia’s banking system is by far the largest and most important 
component of the financial system; as markets for direct finance and other forms of 
financial intermediaries are still in their infancy.  Some indicators of financial sector 
development and dollarization in the Republic of Armenia are presented in table 12.  
The banking system has shown relatively stable growth since 1998 (see Figure 3).  
Banking system (capital) share in GDP also increased up to 2.9% in 2001 (2.6% in 2000). 
In spite of this, the banking sector remains very small compared to the size of the overall 
economy. In 2001, the banking system assets ratio to GDP was 20%, the loan portfolio to 
GDP ratio was 9%, and the ratio of household deposits to GDP was 5%. Total loans 7 % 
                                                           
9 For example, see the data provided by Stiglitz  J.E. "The role of the state in financial markets"  (1994). 
10 Robert G. King and Ross Levine "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, CVIII, no. 3(August 1993), 717-738.   
11 See David Dollar and Aart Kraay “Growth is good for the poor” March 2000. 
  9and total deposits approximately 12.1 % of GDP in 2002. A comparison of Armenia’s 
financial sector development with respect to other countries in its region that are at 
comparable stages of transition can be found in Table 13. 
A contributing factor to the small size of the Armenian financial system relative to 
Western countries is the near absence of retail banking market in Armenia.
12 New 
services are developing extremely slowly: a system of credit cards – ArCa was 
introduced just recently. Other financial institutions – insurance companies, pension 
funds and capital-market-related financial institutions have yet to emerge as meaningful 
players.  Moreover, an efficient channel for direct finance is practically absent as 
Armenian stock market development is in its infancy.
 13  The population in general has 
little contact with the banking system either by means of depositing their savings or by 
means of borrowing. Margins of lending remain significant, suggesting high 
administrative costs and other inefficiencies. 
There are a number of problems in the Armenian banking system that impede its 
growth and development.  These include,  
The small size of most banks: 
Since July 1 of 2002 the banks are required to have a statutory capital of about 
1.450 million USD, after (from July 1 of 2003) total required capital for the banking 
system will rise to 2.0 million USD. In 2001, there were 30 banks operating in Armenia.  
Since November of 2001 there have been several bank failures and at the end of 2002 
there were only 22 banks are operating in the market. This consolidation of the banking 
                                                           
12 Dollar deposits are mainly in saving accounts.  Cash is the dominate form of payment as most Armenians 
still don’t use checking accounts or credit cards. 
 10system has left 5 banks in control of over 70% of total bank capital. According to data 
provided by CBA the top three banks in terms of size accounted for 40.3% of bank assets 
in 2002.  The small size of most banks in Armenia precludes them from attaining 
economies of scale. Specifically this prevents the banks from incurring large fixed costs 
of technological modernization.  For instance, Lucas (2001) notes that basic credit 
scoring models cost in excess of $150,000 and the total investment in systems required to 
implement a credit scoring system is around $1,000,000. 
Weak credit culture: 
Prior to Armenia’s independence, bank lending involved making loans to state-run 
companies and the government as part of the centrally planned economy directed much 
of the lending.  Even today government debt makes up a large share of banking assets in 
Armenia.  Hence, credit evaluation and a strong credit culture was not part of the lending 
process prior to 1991.  Development of strong monitoring and management practices in 
the area of lending is underway, but there is still a considerable work to be done.  
Improvements in customer service are needed before the banks can engage in 
relationship-based lending.  In addition, despite the rapid advances in credit scoring 
models and other credit evaluation and management tools worldwide, Armenian banks 
have been slow to adopt these as part of their credit evaluation process. Not only is the 
development of good underwriting standards for bank loans important to the strength of 
the banking sector, and by implication public confidence in banks, sound credit 
evaluation and policies are critical to efficient and effective financial intermediation.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 Although the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which regulates the insurance industry, allows the 
presence and operation of foreign insurance companies, in 2001 insurance premiums share in GDP was 
negligible-just 0.18%.  According to 2002 data stock market capitalization of RA is 0.058% of GDP. 
 11After all, the contributions of the banking sector to economic growth hinge on how well it 
does in allocating Armenia’s savings pool to investment projects. 
Financial Regulatory Structure 
The key laws governing the banking system are the Law on the Central Bank and the 
Law on Banks and Banking activities. Other laws relevant for the banking sector are Law 
on Bankruptcy of Banks and the Law on Secrecy. 
The financial infrastructure in Armenia consists of two formal governmental bodies: 
1) the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which is a part of Government structure and 
operating upon Government decisions and 2) the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Armenia which management structure is described below.   
The Central Bank Board is the governing body of the Central Bank. The Central Bank 
Board consists of the chairman, his deputy and 5 members. Chairman of the Central Bank 
and Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank are included in the Central Bank Board 
according to position. The President of Armenia appoints the Central Bank Board 
members for a period of 5 years. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman are appointed by 
the National Assembly, at the presentation by the President, for a period of 7 years.  
The Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia (CBA) isn’t just the monetary authority 
it also regulates the banking system to ensure its safe and sound operation.  This 
regulation is motivated by the role banks play in the monetary transmission mechanism 
and hence, banking stability is important for the purpose of insuring price stability. The 
Ministry of Finance and Economy regulates the non-banking sectors of the financial 
system, like the insurance market. 
 12Besides conducting open market operations, the CBA also serves the lender of last 
resort to the banking system. General liquidity support to the financial system is provided 
by the CBA through a Lombard facility, any time in the operational day. The lending rate 
of interest (Lombard loan rate) is determined by Board of the CBA for the given two-
week period. 
A Proposal for an Armenian Deposit Insurance System 
 
Deposit insurance should be implemented as part of a broader program of economic 
and financial system reforms.  It is well known that an unintended consequence of federal 
deposit guarantees is moral hazard, which can lead to socially sub-optimal risk taking by 
insured institutions and reduced system stability.  Hence, the implementation of deposit 
insurance would properly be done as the last part of a financial reform package, and as a 
complement to reforms that improve the efficiency and stability of the banking system.  It 
is critically important that the deposit insurance system (DIS) be designed to fit the legal 
and social traditions of Armenia and be consistent with the social welfare goals used to 
justify the DIS’s existence. 
Social Welfare Goals for Deposit Insurance 
Adopting an explicit deposit insurance scheme will help promote the stability of the 
Armenian banking system in two ways.  First, it will provide Armenian policymakers the 
opportunity to credibly withdraw implicit government guarantees of bank liabilities and 
will place a buffer between the losses in failed banks and the public treasury.  It easier, in 
principle, to contain the subsidies associated with explicit deposit guarantee schemes than 
implicit ones, and by implication less difficult to mitigate the perverse incentives of a 
system of explicit guarantees than implicit ones.  Second, a properly designed and 
 13implemented system of explicit deposit insurance should improve depositor confidence in 
the small banks in Armenia, allowing them to grow and compete effectively with the 
larger banks in the banking system.  Increased competition among banks will force banks 
to improve their risk management systems and processes and hence, enhance asset 
quality and the strength of earnings.  Moreover, by reducing the concentration in the 
Armenian banking system the adoption of explicit deposit insurance is one step towards 
curbing the view that the three largest Armenian banks are too-big-to-let fail, thus 
improving market discipline and long-run system stability. 
The primary social welfare goals for an Armenian deposit insurance system are the 
protection of small savers, capital accumulation, and increased financial intermediation.  
These goals are mutually reinforcing, as the crucial point of adopting DIS is that small 
savers have confidence that bank deposits are safe savings vehicles and hence, they will 
place their savings into the banking system.  This in turn, will increase the proportion of 
the savings pool available to fund business investment and hence, promotes economic 
growth and development.  The current inability of Armenia to attract meaningful amounts 
of direct foreign investment makes improving the intermediation of domestic savings 
even more imperative.   
Deposit insurance systems around the world vary in the amount of coverage they 
provide.
14  For countries adopting a deposit insurance scheme the International Monetary 
Fund typically offers one or two times per capita income as a rule of thumb for 
appropriately limiting coverage.
15  However, the capital accumulation social welfare 
objective provides us with a more precise guideline for setting the coverage limits.  
                                                           
14 See Kane and Demirgüç-Kunt (2001). 
15 See Garcia (1999). 
 14Therefore, such reasonable deposit insurance coverage ceiling, consistent with social 
welfare, is the average amount of funds needed for the establishment one additional 
working place in the industry.  
Basic Structure of Deposit Insurance System for Armenia 
There are four decisions that must be made as part of the setup of a deposit insurance 
system.  First, what types of liabilities/deposits are to be covered and to what extent?  
Second, how will the deposit guarantees be priced?  Third, what type of fund will be 
established and how will it be capitalized?  Fourth, how will the DIS fit into the 
regulatory infrastructure of the Republic of Armenia?  The answers to these questions are 
pivotal in determining how well DIS can deliver the intended social benefits at the lowest 
resource costs. 
Coverage  
It is well-established that empirical research supports the hypotheses that narrow 
coverage enhances market discipline and reduces moral hazard
16. The narrow coverage 
specifically means excluding certain types of deposits.  For example, it is common to 
exclude interbank deposits from deposit insurance coverage.  One reason for this is that 
banks through the interbank market serve as an important source of market discipline that 
complements official regulation.  It is also undesirable to extend insurance coverage to 
foreign-currency deposits in Armenia.
17  Guaranteeing deposits denominated in foreign 
currencies would complicate the resolution of officially failed banks by requiring the DIS 
to convert its assets into foreign currencies – and likely at a time when foreign exchange 
is at a premium.  Alternatively, it would require the DIS to hold its insurance reserve in 
                                                           
16 See E. Kane and A. Demirgüç-Kunt (2002). 
 15foreign denominated assets, thereby reducing investment in Armenian assets and 
offsetting some of the social benefits of deposit insurance.  Finally, excluding foreign-
currency denominated deposits from deposit insurance coverage would put pressure on 
government authorities to operate the deposit insurance system more efficiently. 
One of the key points, that needs to be discussed during DIS adoption is the 
determination of the limits of coverage on those types of deposits eligible for government 
guarantees.  The purpose of such limitations is two-fold.  First, most of the social benefits 
from deposit insurance are captured with low levels of deposit insurance coverage, and a 
decreasing marginal benefit as coverage levels are increased.  Second, the marginal social 
cost of government-provided deposit insurance is an increasing function coverage levels.  
The increasing social costs of official deposit insurance derive from its impact on the risk 
taking incentives and efficiency of commercial banks’ management.  This is something 
that was well understood by economists and policymakers at the time the United States 
adopted federal deposit insurance as part of the Glass-Steagall reforms of 1933.
18  
Clearly, the net social benefits of official deposit guarantees are the highest under a 
system of partial coverage, and with fairly low coverage limits.  
As we can see from cross-country analysis [see for instance Demirgüç-Kunt (2001)] 
the amount of deposit insurance coverage varies across countries.  While the coverage 
limits in each country will be a function of many country-specific factors it is the case 
that the level of coverage appears to be positively correlated with level of economic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 The omission of foreign-exchange deposits from deposit insurance coverage would reduce the incentives 
to hold dollars and thereby, might reduce the level of dollarization in RA (41.1% in 2002, see Figure 4). 
18 See Emerson (1934) and the Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933). 
 16development of the country.
19 
To derive the optimal ceiling on deposit insurance coverage requires a detailed cost-
benefit analysis that is well beyond the scope of this paper.  We propose an alternative 
method for arriving at the coverage limit that links deposit insurance coverage to one of 
the objectives for DIS, to promote the holding of savings in the form of bank deposits to 
promote economic development.  From this objective we have tried to evaluate a 
reasonable boundary values of deposits to be insured.  As such, we consider the average 
sum of savings needed for the establishment one additional working place in the 
economy.  So this sum (average size of investment) grossed up by some reasonably small 
number to account for additional working capital needs should be the basis for setting the 
ceiling on deposit insurance coverage.    
One feature of Armenian deposit insurance that merits consideration is the adoption 
of a graduated system of guarantees, or coinsurance for deposit balances in excess of the 
fully insured limit.  Essentially, the graduated system would guarantee 100 percent of 
deposits up to the limit established using our ‘average sum of investment required to 
establish a small business’ limit, and some declining percentage of deposits above that 
limit.  For example, the original plan for deposit insurance in the United States had the 
following graduated structure: 
First $10,000    100 percent 
$10,001 to $50,000   75 percent 
$50,001 and up     50 percent. 
Premiums 
                                                           
19 The coverage varies, ranging from 0.2 times per capita GDP in the Ukraine to 19.4 times per capita GDP 
in Chad. Coverage limits average 20,660 US dollars per deposit for all countries, but range from as low as 
 17It is, perhaps, not surprising that the price nations charge for official deposit insurance 
coverage varies widely across countries, with the percentage charged for coverage 
connected with the level of financial depth and development in the country.  The cross-
country studies of deposit insurance find that the insurance premiums are range from 
0.005% (Bangladesh) to 2% (Venezuela) of insured deposits.
20 
As we know from theoretical literature deposit insurance should price the estimated 
risk the bank passes through to the insurer.  To estimate bank risk and set deposit 
insurance premiums, regulators typically use qualitative indicators collected from on-site 
and off-site bank examinations, together with accounting-based indicators, such as 
CAMEL-type indicators.
 21   
At this point in time arriving at a system of fully risk-adjusted premiums for deposit 
insurance for Armenian banks is problematic at best.  Such a system would require more 
sophisticated banking accounting systems and more granular regulatory data collection 
on than is currently feasible.  In addition, it would require the adoption of mathematical 
and financial modeling that is currently beyond what official agencies are capable of 
producing at this time. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the 
explicit pricing of deposit insurance is of second-order importance relative to “loss 
control.”  For one, fair value of deposit insurance depends on the both the probability of 
default by a bank and the loss to the insurance fund given the default.  Ronn and Verma 
() show how the fair value of deposit guarantees is conditioned upon the loss threshold at 
which the failure of a bank is officially recognized.  In addition, Buser, Chen and Kane 
(1981) show how regulation can used to implicitly adjust the value of deposit guarantees.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
120 US dollars in the Ukraine to as high as 243,520 US dollars in Norway. 
20 See Laeven (2002). 
 18Hence, while truly risk-based premiums are a desirable feature of any official deposit 
insurance scheme, coverage and closure policies are more critical.  Hence, we argue that 
initially a risk-related premium system should be established as an interim step towards 
fairly priced guarantees.  As such, we recommend that the Republic of Armenia adopt a 
premium system similar to that adopted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 
the early 1990s where banks are divided into 9 premium classes based on 
regulatory/examination rating and overall capitalization.  Premiums should be assessed 
initially according to total risk-adjusted bank assets with adjustments made for off-
balance sheet exposures – until the fund is fully capitalized – and then only on insured 
deposits.  We recommend that the initial premium schedule be set with the lowest 
premium in the range of 8 basis points and the highest no greater than 100 basis points. 
Finally, the interim deposit insurance pricing scheme should have an explicit sunset 
date.  We recommend that five years after the adoption of deposit insurance or two years 
after the adoption of the Basel II capital standards, which ever comes first, a full –risk 
adjusted pricing schedule be adopted.  Moreover, the enabling legislation should require 
the commission of a study of risk-adjusted premiums to be undertaken within a year of 
enactment.  Finally, the DIS of Armenia should explore reinsuring some of its exposure 
abroad, either through private reinsurance agencies or through multinational lenders such 
as the International Monetary Fund. 
Fund  
The level of the explicit deposit insurance reserve (henceforth, fund) is less important 
than the fund’s call on taxes and special assessments on depository institutions should the 
fund become depleted.  There are, therefore, three general decisions to make concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Ibid footnote 22. 
 19the deposit insurance reserve (henceforth, fund).  First, what is the mechanism for 
initially capitalizing the fund?  Second, what level of the fund should be established?  
Third, how should shortfalls in the fund be addressed?  Ideally, the initial capitalization 
of the fund should not result in the capital impairment of any insured institution and 
should not be done using resources of the CBA.  Given the political infeasibility of direct 
or indirect taxpayer capitalization of the fund, as was the case with the initial 
capitalization of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s fund in the United States,
22 
we suggest the following mechanism be used.  After determining the initial level of the 
fund the Republic of Armenia should issue bonds to capitalize the fund. The bonds would 
be paid-off over a ten-year period out of premium income.  The DIS would have the 
authority to charge an additional 20 basis points per dollar of assets if needed to service 
this debt.  Given the lack of development and depth of financial markets in Armenia it is 
unlikely that these bonds could be placed with private investors.  Therefore, we suggest 
that banks be required to hold these bonds up to a limit of three percent of their assets.  
Banks would be free to sell the bonds to other financial institutions and private investors 
(foreign and domestic).  However, the Central Bank would be forbidden to invest in the 
DIS bonds and except for emergency borrowing DIS bonds would not be eligible 
collateral for CBA Lombard loans. 
The ongoing or operating fund should have the resources to simultaneously handle 
the costs of resolving the two largest banks in Armenia.  The DIS would not have access 
to borrowings from the CBA.  However, the DIS would have two additional sources of 
                                                           
22 The surplus in the capital accounts of the Federal Reserve Banks was used to initially capitalize the 
FDIC’s insurance reserve.  While the Reserve Banks were given securities in exchange for the surplus, they 
proceeded to charge-off of these claims against their earnings until the securities were completely written 
off.  In effect, the FDIC’s fund was capitalized using seigniorage revenues (taxes).  See Todd (1988). 
 20funds.  First, if the DIS fund is depleted the DIS would have the authority to levy an 
assessment equal to two percent of insured deposits on member institutions.  Second, 
should such an assessment prove inadequate to handle impending failures the DIS will be 
able to borrow against an emergency backup line of credit from the Ministry of Finance 
and the Economy.  However, the drawing of the line of credit could only be done if a 
majority of the DIS board, the Chairman of the head of the Central Bank and the Minister 
of Finance and the Economy sign a letter authorizing its use. 
The DIS fund should be invested primarily in the official debt of the Republic of 
Armenia with a limited amount of cash reserves.  It is our recommendation that, if 
practical, the receivership function associated with resolving the affairs of closed banks 
be handled by an agency separate from the DIS.  This will reduce some conflicts of 
interest between the receivership function and the insurance function that exist in the 
U.S.’s Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, make losses to the fund more transparent, 
and avoid tying up DIS reserves in illiquid assets.  
Finally, should the DIS insurance reserve fall below the statutory minimum, as 
defined above, the DIS will have the authority to assess a special premium of up to 20 
basis points against the assets of insured depository institutions.  It is recommended that 
when the fund reaches a level that is in excess of 150 percent of the statutory minimum 
that 50 percent of premiums be rebated to the banks (so long as there are no outstanding 
capitalization bonds or outstanding balances on the emergency lines of credit). 
Membership 
Ideally, membership in a system of deposit insurance would be voluntary, with 
appropriate entrance and exit fees to prevent free riding.  Entry and exit by banks would 
serve as signal to regulators as to the underlying condition of the fund and reduces the 
 21incentives for regulatory forbearance.  However, it is not clear that a voluntary fund could 
be operated in an emerging market nation, particularly one with an underdeveloped 
financial system.  Hence, we recommend that as a condition of charter banks be required 
to belong to the DIS for a minimum of ten years. 
 
Regulatory Infrastructure 
As one goal of DIS is to protect small savers there is no justification for providing de 
jure or de facto guarantees of large deposits.  Large depositors and other financial market 
participants must have the incentive to provide market discipline to the banking system.  
Moreover, the structure and operation of the DIS must be consistent with needs of 
uninsured claimants to protect themselves from loss without triggering large scale runs on 
the banks or implicit protection from the DIS.  This means adopting a governance 
structure for the DIS that is independent from political influence, but has input from 
market participants and other regulatory bodies. 
We suppose that this structure’s members can represent and divided by the following 
logic. The structure (board of governors) members (7) can be divided by the following 
scheme: the president of the Union of Banks of Armenia, two additional members elected 
by the banks in the DIS, the Chairman of CBA, the Minister of Finance and Economy, 
and two political appointees, one of whom will serve as DIS Chairman.  Of the political 
appointees, only one can be a member of the majority coalition in the Parliament.  The 
Chairman of the CBA and the Minister of Finance and the Economy will serve as non-
voting members on the DIS board of governors. 
 22Conclusion 
  Increasingly developing nations, spurred on in part by international lending 
agencies, are looking at deposit insurance as the magic bullet of financial system reform.  
Stabilization and development of the financial system, which in most transition 
economies is the banking system, is considered a critical part of economic development.  
The link between the depth of financial system development and economic growth is well 
documented in recent empirical work. 
  The 1980s experience of the United States with federal deposit insurance provides 
a stark reminder that government guarantees of deposits is not a panacea.  Moreover, 
recent studies of deposit insurance in developing nations illustrates how poorly designed 
system of government deposit guarantees can be destabilizing.  Hence, the addition of 
explicit deposit guarantees to a country’s official financial safety net should be done only 
after careful consideration, specifically taking into account country circumstances in its 
design. 
We provide an overview of the design for a system of official deposit guarantees 
for the Republic of Armenia.  This proposed design takes into consideration the overall 
structure of the Armenian economy, its official institutions and the financial system.  
Furthermore, we outline specific design features for the Armenian deposit insurance 
system that are consistent with the social welfare objectives that underpin arguments for 
its adoption, while minimizing the distortions of these government guarantees on 
incentives.  Key among the design features are limited coverage of deposits, separation of 
deposit insurance from central banking, and extended liability of banks for losses 
incurred by the deposit insurance fund. 
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Figure 10. Share of industry in GDP of RA 
 
 















































































































Table 1. GDP real growth index by real sector
26 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP  100  88.3 51.4 46.9 49.4 52.8 55.9 57.8 62.0 64.1 67.9 74.4 
Industry  100  96.0 38.7 42.1 46.2 47.4 47.9 48.5 47.5 49.9 53.1 55.1 
Agriculture  100  98.0 92.3 87.0 89.7 93.2 95.1  90.8  102.5 103.9 101.4 113.2 
Construction  100  75.3  11.1  8.8 9.3 8.8 11.0  4.0 4.4 4.8 6.1 7.0 
Transport & 
Communication 
100  79.2 33.3 10.0 9.6  10.6 12.4 13.5 13.7 13.8 13.7 15.9 




Table 2. The structure of gross agricultural output in 2002 













Table 3. Volume of industrial production by production sectors 
(millions AMD) 
 
  1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 2002 
Total  industry  254315.6 261167.6 283484.8  300549.7 306714.2 339836.4 
Mining  8926.1  10222.7 11037.5  16058.6 20222.6 30208.3 
Manufacturing  177021.9 163580.8 181843.0  193821.8 198830.5 226632.5 
Production and distribution 
of electricity and water  68367.6 87364.1 90604.3  90669.3 87661.1 82995.6 
 
                                                           
26 According to data Economic Development and Research Center (www.eic.am). 
 35Table 4. Structure of industrial production by production sectors 
(percent of total) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002 
Total  industry  100 100 100 100  100  100 
Mining  3.5 3.9 3.9 5.3  6.6  8.9 
Manufacturing  69.6 62.6 64.1 64.5  64.8  66.7 
Production and distribution 





Table 5. Industrial capital assets by branches of industry 
(millions AMD) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total  industry  126225.5  1156250.4 1138158.8 1171341.0 1205412.0 
 Electric power  11626.1  1013867.8  981752.1  993998.9  996229.6 
Ferrous  metallurgy  227.8 243.9 366.4 371.5 281.7 
Non-ferrous  metallurgy  27278.5 3592.14 37456.9 38517.9 42681.8 
Chemical and petrochemical 
industry  3728.8 4821.7 5029.8 8486.8 16669.4 
Machinery  and  metalworking  35852.3 41523.0 40433.5 42082.6 42951.6 
Logging, wood-working, pulp 
and paper industry  877.5  2338.1 2446.0 2983.1 2678.8 
Building materials industry  7104.1  7248.8  10155.3  10095.6  10165.8 
Light  industry  7651.7 7395.2 8102.2 9735.9 8977.2 







Table 6. Structure of import by country 
1997 
 
1998          1999
 




I                                            II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
 
Total  Import                                                  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Russia                                                15.1 23.7 30.4 26.1 24.4 15.1 13.6 29.6 21.4 17.4 18.8 16.8 19.0 12.2 15.1 15.9 20.8 16.0 19.0 23.6 21.37 19.47 18.17 19.82 
CIS countries  33.5                                                30.3 38.2 32.4 29.6 19.2 18.2 33.1 26.6 22.6 23.4 20.5 23.3 17.5 18.7 19.1 24.6 21.5 24.7 29.2 31.67 29.52 28.62 30.85
Belgium                                                  5.1 6.3 4.3 6.4 5.5 7.2 6.2 5.5 10.9 11.1 11.2 9.1 10.8 12.1 9.2 6.3 9.3 10.0 9.8 10.2 10.54 11.28 9.94 9.20
UK                                                  1.7 1.2 0.7 1.1 4.3 5.4 11.4 9.1 9.2 10.3 6.7 7.2 4.1 5.6 8.6 8.3 11.4 8.4 8.4 8.8 2.22 2.67 2.88 2.85
USA                                                  14.4 19.0 11.3 8.6 10.5 12.8 12.8 7.5 10.0 11.8 10.0 10.5 11.6 12.5 8.3 13.1 2.8 4.7 3.8 4.2 4.34 5.05 6.01 5.36
Iran                                                  11.9 12.6 8.1 7.9 6.7 6.8 7.8 7.0 7.7 9.6 9.2 11.6 8.9 7.2 9.4 11.4 2.8 3.5 4.0 5.2 6.67 7.14 6.43 6.30
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Table 7. Structure of export by country 
1997 
 
1998          1999
 
2000 2001 2002  
 
Percent of total  I                                           II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
 
Total  Export                                                  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Russia                                                28.2 22.9 30.6 26.7 21.3 24.1 14.2 11.7 13.3 15.8 13.1 16.3 9.6 13.6 18.8 16.5 16.8 18.1 17.8 21.0 13.08 11.52 13.08 19.82 
CIS countries  36.0                                                31.9 42.2 47.9 49.8 39.4 29.8 25.3 26.8 23.1 19.8 27.3 24.9 20.6 26.0 26.8 33.3 27.2 22.1 26.9 21.08 18.31 19.16 30.85
Belgium                                                27.3 24.7 14.7 18.1 21.4 22.5 19.9 27.1 37.7 28.1 38.9 40.4 36.0 27.1 15.4 17.6 14.7 14.7 12.7 14.7 25.29 23.47 20.24 9.20 
UK                                                  0.9 14.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 2.5 8.0 4.0 3.8 4.1 4.7 3.7 4.3 3.1 3.0 3.3 4.0 5.3 5.3 9.6 6.06 8.19 9.03 2.85
USA                                                  2.3 2.4 3.3 3.7 5.3 3.9 4.3 7.8 5.7 7.7 6.2 8.1 8.2 8.4 11.1 21.1 15.3 9.5 17.1 21.4 7.27 8.20 9.26 5.36
Iran                                                  19.5 20.3 19.9 15.2 12.1 11.8 15.1 18.6 15.4 21.4 14.7 7.7 7.4 15.7 10.3 6.2 7.2 11.4 13.9 7.2 4.52 6.40 6.58 6.30
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Table 8. Export structure of RA by commodity 
 
 
            1998 1999
 
2000 2001 2002  
 
Million USD  1996                                           1997 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
 
Total Export  290.3                                            232.5 56.8 59.6 54.5 49.6 59.6 56.6 57.2 58.3 58.7 81.4 72.1 85.2 76.7 79.0 83.7 103.3 120.1 105.2 130.1 151.8
Foodstuffs  11.8                                            24.6 5.0 6.9 2.1 2.8 3.0 4.1 3.3 5.6 4.6 5.4 6.2 11.2 10.5 11.7 12.2 13.6 15.0 9.5 17.0 17.8
Mineral products  19.1                                            17.9 4.4 7.5 9.4 9.5 10.4 10.7 9.3 7.6 6.8 10.3 7.9 9.2 10.0 9.2 12.1 7.1 10.9 10.7 12.1 8.3
Plastics and Rubbery 
materials 
5.4                                            4.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.7 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 2.9 2.3
Textile Production  9.7                                            10.6 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.9 2.8 4.6 3.3 2.9 2.5 3.2 3.5 4.1 3.3 3.3 7.7 10.0 6.8 6.2 8.6 7.0
Precious Stones and 
Metals  
140.3                                            55.2 12.1 13.4 12.9 14.7 25.6 19.7 28.3 26.2 29.6 34.6 27.8 29.4 29.4 25.8 25.3 42.4 68.2 53.9 58.4 78.6
Base Metals and goods 
from them 
47.3                                            57.7 10.1 12.4 9.7 8.1 8.2 8.4 3.4 5.0 7.5 14.6 11.2 10.9 9.9 13.4 11.0 9.2 7.1 12.1 12.6 12.9
Machinery and 
Equipment 
  34.3 32.2                                          15.8 10.1 10.6 4.3 4.2 3.5 4.4 5.4 3.3 5.8 6.9 15.0 6.3 5.4 7.9 9.0 5.8 4.2 4.2 7.1
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Table 9. Structure of export of RA by commodity’s share 
 
 
            1998 1999
 
2000 2001 2002  
 
Million USD  1996                                           1997 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
 
Total Export  100.0                  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Foodstuffs  4.1                                            10.6 8.7 11.6 3.9 5.7 5.1 7.2 5.7 9.5 7.8 6.6 8.6 13.1 13.7 14.8 14.6 13.2 12.5 9.0 13.1 11.7
Mineral products  6.6                                            7.7 7.7 12.6 17.2 19.2 17.4 19.0 16.2 13.0 11.6 12.7 11.0 10.8 13.0 11.7 14.5 6.9 9.0 10.2 9.3 5.5
Plastics and Rubbery 
materials 
1.9                                            1.9 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.2 1.1 2.6 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.5 2.2 1.5
Textile Production  3.4                                            4.5 5.8 5.1 6.1 7.9 4.7 8.1 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.9 4.9 4.8 4.2 4.2 9.3 9.7 5.6 5.9 6.6 4.6
Precious Stones and 
Metals  
48.3                                            23.8 21.2 22.5 23.6 29.7 43.0 34.9 49.6 44.9 50.5 42.5 38.5 34.5 38.4 32.6 30.2 41.0 56.8 51.2 44.9 51.8
Base Metals and goods 
from them 
16.3                                            24.8 17.8 20.8 17.8 16.4 13.8 14.8 6.0 8.5 12.7 17.9 15.6 12.8 12.8 16.9 13.1 8.9 5.8 11.5 9.7 8.5
Machinery and 
Equipment 
  11.8 13.8                                          27.8 16.9 19.5 8.7 7.0 6.2 7.8 9.2 5.7 7.2 9.5 17.6 8.2 6.8 9.4 8.7 4.8 4.0 3.22 4.7

















  40Table 10. Import structure of RA by commodity 
 
 
            1998 1999
 
2000 2001 2002  
 
Million USD  1996                                           1997 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
 
Total Import  855.8                                          892.3 203.9 211.7 214.1 272.6 180.6 189.3 200.8 240.6 201.3 235.3 196.4 252.2 178.8 216.5 222.4 256.7 204.4 202.6 267.3 316.7 
Products from animals  67.4                                            58.5 10.7 11.7 11.9 12.8 8.8 11.6 6.5 14.6 8.0 9.1 5.8 10.7 7.2 8.6 7.5 7.4 6.1 7.9 6.5 7.4
Products from plant 
cultivation 
114.9                                            105.3 32.3 36.3 19.5 29.8 10.4 15.4 18.2 31.7 23.1 27.3 16.7 31.5 16.4 24.8 20.4 23.3 23.7 24.1 20.2 24.7
Foodstuffs  83.0                                            86.0 24.9 28.1 28.1 29.0 17.4 19.4 20.0 20.2 13.0 18.8 18.1 19.7 15.1 20.1 19.0 22.7 16.7 15.4 22.7 24.3
Mineral products  186.5                                            209.7 55.0 38.7 45.7 66.7 48.0 41.3 39.3 47.4 44.7 39.1 41.4 56.5 49.0 31.2 54.6 49.9 41.2 26.2 48.0 58.9
Plastics and Rubbery 
materials 
56.2                                            85.2 13.9 19.6 22.0 18.2 15.4 19.7 20.3 16.0 17.2 25.4 17.8 22.1 10.7 19.1 14.9 20.4 17.9 19.8 25.6 22.0
Textile Production  21.0                                            33.6 6.2 7.6 9.1 8.9 6.5 8.7 8.0 6.8 5.3 10.3 6.2 10.1 6.6 10.1 10.4 9.1 6.2 9.8 10.6 9.0
Precious Stones and 
Metals  
129.8                                            47.5 9.4 12.5 11.0 12.7 19.4 20.8 23.0 23.5 28.8 30.2 25.3 29.0 23.1 20.5 26.3 36.9 39.0 37.4 57.9 79.2
Base Metals and goods 
from them 
10.2                                            24.6 4.8 4.4 5.9 5.1 5.2 7.1 6.8 4.8 4.0 5.4 7.7 7.3 5.5 9.7 9.8 11.1 9.6 12.8 11.1 22.2
Machinery and 
Equipment 
  80.5 102.1                                          16.2 15.2 15.6 31.9 17.2 14.5 19.5 35.3 26.9 35.6 25.7 28.9 16.0 23.3 18.9 30.2 20.9 22.5 28.4 31.7












  41Table 11. Structure of import of RA by commodities share’s 
 
 
            1998 1999
 
2000 2001 2002  
 
Million USD  1996                                           1997 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
 
Total Import  100.0                  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Products from animals  7.9                                            6.6 5.2 5.5 5.5 4.7 4.9 6.1 3.2 6.1 4.0 3.9 3.0 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.9 2.4 2.3
Products from plant 
cultivation 
13.4                                            11.8 15.8 17.1 9.1 10.9 5.8 8.1 9.1 13.2 11.5 11.6 8.5 12.5 9.2 11.5 9.2 9.1 11.6 11.9 7.5 7.8
Foodstuffs  9.7                                            9.6 12.2 13.2 13.1 10.6 9.6 10.2 10.0 8.4 6.4 8.0 9.2 7.8 8.5 9.3 8.5 8.8 8.2 7.6 8.5 7.7
Mineral products  21.8                                            23.5 27.0 18.3 21.4 24.5 26.6 21.8 19.6 19.7 22.2 16.6 21.1 22.4 27.4 14.4 24.6 19.4 20.1 12.9 18.0 18.6
Chemical production  6.6                                            9.5 6.8 9.3 10.3 6.7 8.5 10.4 10.1 6.6 8.5 10.8 9.0 8.8 6.0 8.8 6.7 8.0 8.7 9.8 9.6 6.9
Textile Production  2.5                                            3.8 3.0 3.6 4.2 3.3 3.6 4.6 4.0 2.8 2.6 4.4 3.2 4.0 3.7 4.7 4.7 3.5 3.0 4.8 4.0 2.8
Precious Stones and 
Metals  
15.2                                            5.3 4.6 5.9 5.1 4.6 10.8 11.0 11.5 9.8 14.3 12.8 12.9 11.5 12.9 9.5 11.8 14.4 19.0 18.5 21.7 25.0
Base Metals and goods 
from them 
1.2                                            2.8 2.3 2.1 2.7 1.9 2.9 3.7 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.3 3.9 2.9 3.1 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.7 6.3 4.1 7.0
Machinery and 
Equipment 
  9.4 11.4                                          7.9 7.2 7.3 11.7 9.5 7.6 9.7 14.7 13.4 15.1 13.1 11.5 8.9 10.8 8.5 11.8 10.2 11.1 10.6 10.0





  42TABLE 12. Indicators of financial sector development and dollarization, 1997-2002 
(millions AMD) 
 
  1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 
Foreign exchange (FX) deposits   23.567  37.975  52.257  108.489  125.044  124.389 
AMD  deposits    9.084 16.167  13.678 19.513 24.673 39.254 
Total  deposits  32.651 54.142 65.935  128.002 149.717 163.643 
Reserve  money  (RM)  50.550  53.839  53.853 72.390 80.369 111.273 
Broad  money  (BM)  70.247 95.512 108.545 150.599 171.046 211.982 
 
Indicators of confidence and financial sector development 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Money multiplier  (=BM/RM)  1.39 1.77 2.02 2.08 2.13 1.95 
Total deposits/Broad money  0.46 0.57 0.61 0.85 0.88 0.75 
 
Indicators of dollarization 
 
  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 
FX deposits/Total deposits  0.72  0.70 0.79 0.85 0.84  0.76 
FX deposits/Broad money  0.34  0.40 0.48 0.72 0.73  0.57 
Source:  Central Bank of Armenia and author’s calculations 
 
 
Table 13 Bank lending and household deposits (percent of GDP)
27 
Armenia                               1997                     1998                    1999                    2000 
Lending 5.8 6.2 7.5  9.4 
Household  deposits  2.1 3.0 4.3  6.1 
Azerbaijan 
Lending  13.5 13.7 14.3  N/A 
Household  deposits  N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
Georgia 
Lending 3.7 4.7 5.8  6.6 
Household  deposits  1.0 0.8 1.2  1.8 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lending 2.0 5.0 3.0  2.0 
Household  deposits  N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
Moldova 
Lending  N/A N/A 13.0  17.0 
Household  deposits  N/A N/A 5.0 6.0 
 
                                                           
27 See www.gov.am/undp/gipa/main.htm 
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